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Abstract 
The making of the 2004 Constitution was a significant moment amidst 
the continuing conflicts in Afghanistan. It was an attempt to transform 
differences and conflicts into a shared agenda for the future of the 
country. The process of constitution-making in Afghanistan was 
marked by intense negotiations between the international community 
and actors, on the one hand, and domestic actors, on the other. The 
outcome would be called a “win-win solution”. This essay focuses on 
the making of the Islam-related clauses: How was the public 
participation? How has the negotiation been undertaken? What was 
the result and why? This article is an attempt to answer those 
questions. It argues that the process of constitution-making in 
Afghanistan particularly with regard to the Islam clauses is the acts of 
negotiations between different competing actors. The Constitution is the 
product of negotiations not only between international and domestic 
actors, but also among the domestic actors themselves. As evident in 
the making of the Islam clauses, these negotiations might be 
characterized as between puritan Islamist and more moderate Muslim 
actors. 
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A. Introduction 
Islam has been a unifying factor that could bridge 
the differences in the Afghan society. As Olivier Roy 
argued that in Afghanistan “where the concept of the 
nation has developed but recently, where the state is seen 
as external to society and where people’s allegiance is 
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directed primarily towards their local community, the only 
thing which all Afghans have in common is Islam”.1  
For one Afghan ethnic group, Islam constitutes the shared 
identity with another ethnic group, and even with the rest 
of the Muslim communities. Islam as perceived is deeply 
rooted in the minds of the Afghan people. Its role is just 
like that of the tribal ideology in that both assume the 
historic continuity for centuries. Even for many Afghans, 
the interests of Islam are overriding and put above 
everything including the interests of the tribe.2 However, 
Islam might reinforce the existing ethnic conflicts or open 
a new field of conflicts. As it is perceived differently 
amongst the ethnic or interest groups, Islam might be 
used to provide legitimacy of one ethnic or political 
movement. The Mujahideen, Taliban and other Islamist 
groups, for instance, have fought by using the symbols of 
this religion.  
The withdrawal of the Taliban from power has 
brought a new phase in the Afghan history. Despite 
various great problems created following the withdrawal, 
Afghanistan has attempted to re-build the nation. Nation-
building involved the establishment of various aspects of 
the Afghan society from building infrastructures to 
providing rule of law and rebuilding the national identity.3 
With the assistance of the international community, the 
interim government was established and the agenda for 
the future of the nation was set. Two significant tasks 
ahead were to craft a new constitution and to organize an 
election to appoint a new accountable government.  
The making of the 2004 Constitution was 
significant amidst the continuing conflicts. It was an 
 
1 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 30. 
2 Nabi Misdaq, Afghanistan: Political Frailty and Foreign 
Interference (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 235. 
3 Larry P Goodson, “The Lessons of Nation-Building in 
Afghanistan,” in Francis Fukuyama (ed.), Nation-Building: Beyond 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2006), 145.  
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attempt to transform the difference and conflicts into a 
shared agenda for the future of Afghanistan. The 
Constitution was made to a significant extent according to 
the recent conception of constitution-making which is 
founded on democratic principles particularly the public 
participation. The process of its making was marked by 
intense negotiations between international community 
and actors, on the one hand, and domestic actors, on the 
other. The outcome could be called a “win-win solution”. 
With the great influence of international actors in the 
process of constitution-making, its process and outcome 
were not necessarily under the intense pressure of those 
actors. On the other hand, the inclusion of the Islam 
clauses does not mean that domestic actors were in 
agreement in what Islam there should be understood.  
This article is an attempt to answer the problems 
surrounding the process of constitution-making in 
Afghanistan. It challenges the description of the 
constitution-making as merely imposed 
constitutionalism4 and also as negotiations between two 
intellectually solid groups of actors, who argued against 
each other. It argues that Afghanistan’s new constitution 
was the product of negotiations between competing actors 
and ideologies. It was the area of negotiations between 
international, foreign actors – pursuing to bring the ideals 
of western constitutionalism into a new constitution – and 
domestic actors. It was also the field of intense debate 
among domestic actors who had different conceptions of 
Islam and how this religion should play roles in the public 
arena.  
 
 
4 On this issue, see Noah Feldman, “Imposed 
Constitutionalism,” Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2005), 
857; Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, “Baghdad, 
Tokyo, Kabul… Constitution Making in Occupied States,” William and 
Mary Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 4 (2008), 1141; Manon Bonnet, “The 
Legitimacy of Internationally Imposed Constitution-Making in the 
Context of State Building.” in Richard Albert, Xenophon Contiades 
and Alkmene Fotiadou (eds.), The Law and Legitimacy of Imposed 
Constitutions (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), 208. 
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B. The Making of the 2004 Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan  
After reigning power for about two years, the 
Taliban regime was removed from power following the 
invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and its allies 
beginning on 7 October 2001. In the late 2001, various 
Afghan factions, including Afghan military commanders 
who led the Islamic United Front for Salvation of 
Afghanistan, known as the Northern Alliance, 
representatives of Afghan’s different ethnic groups, 
expatriate of Afghans and representative of the exiled 
monarch, met in Bonn, Germany, under the auspices of 
the United Nations in order to set the roadmap for the 
future of Afghanistan. Despite the fact that the meeting 
was attended by different groups, it was still considered 
as not representing the people of Afghanistan.5 In 
addition, the external pressures especially from the US to 
reach an agreement were obvious in the process of 
negotiations. Finally, on 5 December 2001 the Bonn 
Agreement was signed. It was aimed at ‘the re-
establishment of permanent government institutions’6 and 
to make the government progressively more 
representative.  
The agreement restored much of the 1964 
Constitution. In this sense, it provided legal continuity. 
The 1964 Constitution embodied the birth of democratic 
governance in Afghanistan, providing “guarantees of 
 
5 Barnett R Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan,” 
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2004), 7; Human Rights Watch, 
“Afghanistan’s Bonn Agreement One Year Later: A Catalog of Missed 
Opportunities,” 5 December 2003, 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan/bonn1
yr-bck.pdf, accessed on 2 February 2020. 
6 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan 
Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 
UN Doc S/2001/1154 (5 December 2001), 
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/AF_0112
05_AgreementProvisionalArrangementsinAfghanistan%28en%29.pdf,  
accessed on 3 February 2020. 
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public liberty unprecedented in Afghan history”.7 It was 
regarded the finest constitution ever made in the Muslim 
world at that time. It was drafted by a seven-member 
committee of experts. There was relatively wide public 
participation and consultation that took for about six 
months. The draft was then put under the scrutiny of the 
twenty-nine members of the Constitutional Advisory 
Committee. The process received wide press coverage. The 
draft was further debated in the Loya Jirga before its 
adoption.8 
The Bonn agreement set out the composition, 
functions and governing procedures for the Interim 
Administration as well as the Special Independent 
Commission. This administration would function for six 
months before the establishment of the Transitional 
Administration. The appointment of the personnel of the 
administration according to the Agreement should be 
based on the consideration of ‘professional competence 
and personal integrity’. However, in reality, the personnel 
“were mostly selected to offer patronage to different 
factions and to recognize the distribution of armed might 
on the ground”.9  
The Interim Administration would organize the 
Emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) (ELJ) during this 
time. The Loya jirga, first employed in 1747 in the election 
of Ahmad Shah Durrani as the first king of modern 
Afghanistan, has been the national body holding the 
authoritative decision-making in the country to select a 
new rule, to pass constitutions and to approve 
government policy such as in declaring war. Originally 
consisted of tribal leaders, the Loya Jirga membership 
 
7 Barnett R Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution,” 8. 
8 Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan a Modern History: 
Monarchy, Despotism or Democracy? The Problems of Governance in 
the Muslim Tradition (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 38-
40; Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law in Afghanistan: A Study of the 
Constitutions, Matrimonial Law and the Judiciary (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1985), 21-2.  
9 Barnett R Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution,” 8. 
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changed overtime.10 The 2002 Loya Jirga (ELJ) composed 
of 1,051 representatives was appointed by the Loya Jirga 
Commission. The method of appointment was aimed at 
creating balance in terms of region (rural/urban), 
ethnicity, gender, and social-cultural backgrounds (such 
as religious leaders).11 The appointment was considered 
flawed as military commanders and political parties 
interfered.12 The ELJ worked in the situation where 
insurgency and fear hindered the full exercise of its 
mandate. The warlords made use of every means 
including threats and intimidations against the delegates 
to secure their interests. The intimidations even occurred 
in the voting stage.13 
In June 2002, the ELJ established the transitional 
administration in lieu of the Interim Authority. The Jirga 
convened to appoint Hamid Karzai as the President of the 
Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan.14 The 
Administration, however, was regrettably enjoyed by the 
warlords with little room available for civilians.15 It was 
this administration which was responsible for creating a 
 
10 See Ali Wardak, “Jirga – A Traditional Mechanism of 
Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan,” 13-14,  
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e1bb/262269286e0c4744de97acf6
14686b4a49e6.pdf, accessed on 3 February 2020. 
11 International Crisis Group, “The Loya Jirga: One Small Step 
Forward?,” Afghanistan Briefing, Kabul/Brussels, 16 May 2002, 7, 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/the-loya-jirga-one-small-
step-forward.pdf, accessed on 3 February 2020. 
12 Carlotta Gall, “Afghans Gather to Choose Grand Council,” 
The New York Times (nytimes.com), 3 June 2002. 
13 Barnett R Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution,” 9-10. See also 
International Crisis Group, “The Afghan Transitional Administration: 
Prospects and Perils,” Afghanistan Briefing, Kabul/Brussels, 30 July 
2002.  
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/the-afghan-transitional-
administration-prospects-and-perils.pdf, accessed on 3 February 
2020 particularly on the problem of warlordism.  
14 Carlotta Gall, ‘Traditional Council Elects Karzai as Afghan 
President.” The New York Times (nytimes.com), 14 June 2002. 
15 Omar Zakhilwal and Adeena Niazi, “The Warlords Win in 
Kabul,” The New York Times (nytimes.com), 21 June 2002. 
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commission to provide a draft of a new constitution and 
within eighteen months should convene another Loya 
Jirga to approve the draft submitted. Also, it should 
organize, after twenty-four months, a general election to 
decide on a new government in accordance with the 
requirements set out in the new constitution.16 
There were three organs involved in the 
constitution-making exercise, namely the Constitutional 
Drafting Commission (CDC), the Constitutional Review 
Commission (CRC) and the Constitutional Loya Jirga 
(CLJ). On 5 October 2002, the President appointed nine 
members of the CDC. It was headed by Vice President 
Naematullah Shahrani. Its duty was to produce ‘a 
preliminary draft of the constitution’. This preliminary 
draft served as “a set of recommendations to the 
(Constitutional) Commission on constitutional 
arrangements”.17 In conducting its activities, the 
Commission was aided by the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA). In producing a draft 
constitution, it relied heavily on the 1964 Constitution. 
The Commission had to make use of great efforts to create 
on a single document agreed by all. This was due to the 
lack of, on the one hand, a competent secretariat and, on 
the other, the animosity amongst its members. After six 
months there was no progress in producing the intended 
draft of the constitution. The delay in this stage was likely 
to be caused by the absence of the rules governing the 
Commission’s duties and obligation in the Bonn 
Agreement. The lack of presidential decree explaining the 
Commission’s duties also barred the fulfillment of its 
duties on time.18 Moreover, the members split into two 
 
16 The Bonn Agreement, see above note 9. 
17 The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of 
Afghanistan, “the Constitution-making Process in Afghanistan,” 10 
March 2003, 
http://www.afghandata.org:8080/xmlui/handle/azu/15302, 
accessed on 3 February 2020. 
18 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Flawed 
Constitutional Process,” ICG Asia Report No 56, (Kabul/Brussels: 12 
June 2003), 13, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/56-
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camps, Shahrani and Musa Marufi camps, each of which 
was providing its own draft. A foreign advisor to President 
Karzai also provided another draft.19 In April, the 
Commission finally submitted a draft constitution to the 
President. 
To follow up the results of the CDC, the CRC was 
created on 26 April 2003 by the decree of the President. It 
consisted of thirty-five members, including the members 
of the CDC. Other members involved religious leaders, 
academic staff, representatives of various groups and 
eight women.20 The Commission’s functions included: 
preparing and publishing the draft constitution; 
facilitating and promoting public information on the 
constitution-making process; conducting public 
consultations in each provinces and among Afghan 
refuges; receiving written submissions from individuals 
and groups of Afghan; conducting or commissioning 
studies regarding options for the draft constitution; 
preparing a report regarding public consultation; and 
educating the public on the draft constitution.21 Despite 
the Administration and UNAMA’s promise to be on time 
and accountable, the appointment of the members of the 
Constitutional Commission was in fact delayed for about 
two months. And, the selection process was not 
transparent. There were no governing rules regarding 
criteria or appointment procedures. The Politics of 
 
afghanistan-s-flawed-constitutional-process.pdf, accessed on 3 
February 2020. 
19 Ibid, 14-5; J Alexander Thier, “The Making of a Constitution 
in Afghanistan,” New York Law School Law Review, Vol. 51 (2006/7), 
566-7. 
20 “The Constitutional Process,” http://www.unama-
afg.org/docs/_nonUN%20Docs/_Loya-
Jirga/CLJ/Draft%20Constitution%20Factsheet.doc, accessed on 23 
September 2007. 
21 The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of 
Afghanistan, “the Constitution-making Process,” 3. 
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comprise with political factions together with those flaws 
would undermine the legitimacy of the Commission.22 
The CRC discussed and debated the preliminary 
draft of the constitution. It was grouped into four 
committees consisting of eight members. Each group 
made comments and changes to the draft. These reviews 
and changes were then submitted to the Executive Board. 
The Board ‘compiled, discussed and refined the proposed 
changes for presentation to the General Assembly of the 
Commission’.23 
In discussing constitutional issues, the 
Constitutional Commission consulted with Afghan as well 
as international experts.24 No longer since the 
establishment of the CDC, many constitutional experts 
from the US, Germany and Swiss visited the Commission. 
President Chirac of France offered President Karzai a 
technical assistance.25 A French constitutional lawyer, 
Guy Carcassone, was employed to assist the drafting 
process. He first provided a draft to the president, but it 
was rejected. Then he proposed another failed draft that 
gave emphasis on the power of the president, 
international human rights and established a 
constitutional court.26 The UNAMA, willing to provide 
similar assistance, invited several international 
constitutional lawyers such as Yash Ghai, Bruce 
Ackerman and Donald Horowitz to provide option 
 
22 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Flawed 
Constitutional Process,” 16-7. 
23 Carolyn McCool, “The Role of Constitution-Building 
Processes in Democratization: Case Study Afghanistan,” International 
IDEA Democracy-building & Conflict Management (DCM) (2004), 13. 
24 The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of 
Afghanistan, “the Constitution-making Process,” 4. 
25 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Flawed 
Constitutional Process,” 15 (note 147). 
26 Shamshad Pasarlay, “Making the 2004 Constitution of 
Afghanistan: A History and Analysis Through the Lens of 
Coordination and Deferral Theory,” PhD Dissertation (University of 
Washington, 2016), 215-217; cf. International Crisis Group, 
“Afghanistan’s Flawed Constitutional Process,” 15 (note 147). 
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papers.27 Barnett R Rubin of the United States was also a 
chief among those foreign experts.28 International 
constitution experts were invited to discuss various 
constitutional models in front of the CRC. They even 
actively negotiated in support of particular constitutional 
norms, for instance international human rights 
principles, when confronting Islamic legal norms (Shari’a) 
supported by members of the CRC. The negotiation 
process resulted in a seemingly achieved “balance 
between the Shari’a and human rights”.29 
In order to gain more legitimacy, it was decided that 
the constitutional process should reach diverse, public 
opinions. However, this should not involve controversial 
items of the draft constitution in order to avoid 
instability.30 Prior to public consultation, the Commission 
was required to conduct public education on, among 
others, the constitution-making exercise and their role in 
this process, information about the nature of constitution 
and its impacts on people’s daily life, the Bonn 
Agreement, and the structure of incumbent government.31 
However, the public education was deemed inadequately 
prepared and not well-funded. The UNAMA and the 
Commission were criticized for having “no effective plan 
for such education”.32 Civil society organizations 
 
27 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Flawed 
Constitutional Process,” (note 149). 
28 Barnett R Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution,” 19 (note n 2). He 
noted two other experts (Yash Ghai and Guy Carcassone) who 
together with him were closely engaged with the constitution-making. 
The option papers presented by some international experts could be 
found in Afghanistan Constitutional Reform Resources, Center on 
International Cooperation, New York University, 
https://cic.nyu.edu/afghanistan-constitutional-reform-resources. 
29 Yash Ghai, “A Journey around Constitutions: Reflections on 
Contemporary Constitutions,” South African Law Journal, Vol. 122, 
No. 4 (2005), 804, 827. 
30 J Alexander Thier, “The Making of a Constitution,” 568. 
31 The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of 
Afghanistan, “the Constitution-making Process,” 7. 
32 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Flawed 
Constitutional Process,” 17-8. 
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conducted separate public education. In June 2003, for 
instance, the Afghan Civil Society Forum (AZSF) initiated 
civic education training community leaders in 32 
provinces.33  
Public consultation was conducted for two months. 
Regional offices carrying out the consultation procedures 
were opened such as in Kunduz, Kandahar, Jalalabad 
and Herat. Offices were also established in Iran and 
Pakistan to serve the refugees. Members of the CRC 
traveled to 32 provincial capitals. They held meetings with 
pre-selected groups and engaged public education 
regarding the new likely constitution, preparing for public 
consultation. Ten target groups were deemed the most 
representative groups of Afghan society by the Secretariat 
of the CRC. They were tribal elders, ulama, women, 
members of the ELJ, businesspersons, academics, 
professionals, youth, Afghan members of national and 
international NGOs and any other groups identified as 
important to be consulted with by the Commission.34 
Here, printed materials were distributed. Public 
consultation began on 7 June 2003. More than 150,000 
people attended 523 consultative meetings. The members 
also circulated questionnaires. More than 80,000 
questionnaires were returned. In addition, there were 
about 6,000 proposals and 17,000 verbal opinions 
submitted to the CRC.35 Describing this process, Thiers 
noted: 
The public consultation process did manage to 
reach to a number of people. Independent civil 
society networks played a role by holding training 
sessions and consultations, while working groups 
 
33 Carolyn McCool, “The Role of Constitution-Building 
Processes,” 14. 
34 Secretariat Constitutional Review Commission, “Public 
Consultation Strategy,” 
http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/public_consultation_st
rategy..pdf, accessed on 3 February 2020. 
35 “The Constitutional Process,” above note 23; The Secretariat 
of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, “the Constitution-
making Process,” 7-8. 
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contribute to the process from the outside. In the 
end, thousands of comments were received and 
logged by the staff of the Constitutional 
Commission.36 
 
In fact, the UNAMA acknowledged that the process 
of public consultation had many limitations. It did not 
reach rural areas and not engage the majority of people. It 
was designed “to minimize the ability of Afghans to speak 
freely”.37 The main concern in this stage as in others is 
security. Together with the weakness of the Transitional 
Administration and the threats of warlords, the “light-
footprint” policy of the international regime contributed to 
the unsatisfactory process of public consultation.38 The 
light-footprint policy meant that the UN “should first and 
foremost bolster Afghan capacity – both official and non-
governmental – and rely on as limited an international 
presence and as many Afghan staff as possible”.39   
The public consultation was concluded in late July 
2003. And, based on this the Constitutional Commission 
should finalize the draft in the required date, August 
2003. However, the draft was submitted to the President 
in late September 2003 and then released to the public on 
3 November 2003. The delay of the release was mainly 
caused by the center’s attempts to impose its interest in 
the draft constitution. Several members of the cabinet 
and other influential figures were unhappy with the draft 
submitted by the Commission. They attempted to revise 
some critical issues in the draft particularly that was 
dealing with the power of the President.40 It was this 
 
36 J Alexander Thier, “The Making of a Constitution,” 569 
37 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Flawed 
Constitutional Process,” 19. 
38 See ibid, 22-4. 
39 Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, 
Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford: Oxford 
University press, 2005), 89. 
40 J Alexander Thier, “The Making of a Constitution,” 568; 
International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: The Constitutional Loya 
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revised draft that was submitted to the Constitutional 
Loya Jirga (CLJ).  
The creation of the CLJ, which would decide on the 
ratification of the draft, was put into effect with the decree 
of the President on 15 July 2003.41 The CLJ consisted of 
five hundred members (Article 2). Four hundred and fifty 
members are elected: 344 members are elected at the 
district level; 42 members are elected from refugees and 
displaced people, of whom fifteen percent are women; and 
64 women members. Fifty members are appointed by the 
President, of whom 25 are women. The other 25 
appointed members are selected from legal scholars, 
constitutional and other experts (Article 6). The 
Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission was 
entrusted to organize, hold and convene the election of 
the CLJ’s members (Article 7). In the election process, 
harassment and intimidation was reported to occur before 
delegates went to vote.42 Granted by the law, the 
Executive Committee was established to “[take] measures 
aimed at correcting, deterring, prosecuting and punishing 
such abusers” (Article 9b). The CLJ had more favorable 
condition for meetings and discussions, than the previous 
Jirga. The UN could maintain security for the delegates. 
The government provided better organizational 
infrastructure for the work of the CLJ as well. The 
warlords to some extent could no longer use threats and 
intimidation towards the delegates.43  
The constitutional process in the CLJ took place for 
about 22 days from 14 December 2003 until the adoption 
 
Jirga,” Afghanistan Briefing, Kabul/Brussels, 12 December 2003, 2-
3, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/afghanistan-the-
constitutional-loya-jirga.pdf, accessed on 3 February 2020. 
41 Decree of the President of the Islamic Transitional State of 
Afghanistan on the Convening of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, 
24/04/1382 (15 July 2003), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b27b20f4.html, accessed on 3 
February 2020. 
42 Carolyn McCool, “The Role of Constitution-Building 
Processes,” 14. 
43 Barnett R Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution,” 10. 
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of the constitution in 4 January 2004. The rules of 
procedure of the CLJ were established by the Order of the 
President in November 2003.44 Briefing the delegates on 
the draft constitution would be carried out by the CRC, 
assisted by the Secretariat (Article 17). In the Plenary on 
the draft, the delegates would opine and debate the 
contents of the draft (Article 18). The thorough discussion 
on the provisions of the draft would be held by ten 
working committees of the CLJ. The concluding reports of 
the committees would be presented to the Plenary and 
Reconciliation Committee (Article 19). The Reconciliation 
Committee, consisting of the members of the Bureau and 
the Chairpersons of the Working Committees, would ‘seek 
reconciliation of the views and proposals of the Working 
Committees’. The Bureau, composing of the Chairperson, 
three Deputies and three Rapporteurs-General, would 
prepare a revised draft of the constitution based on the 
agreement reached in the Working Committees and the 
Reconciliation Committee. This revised draft should be 
given an agreement by the Reconciliation Committee. The 
Bureau would present the amended draft to the Plenary 
for adoption (Article 20).  
The dynamics of relatively free speech marked the 
constitution-making process in the CLJ: in the debating 
stage, several constitutional provisions became highly 
contentious amongst the participants, including the 
power of the President, the role of parliament and the 
Supreme Court, official languages and the “Islamic 
republic” clause;45 one delegate, Malalai Joya, sharply 
criticized the Mujahideen and called its leaders as 
criminals destroying the country; the Jihadi delegates 
boycotted the Committee work as they were unhappy with 
 
44 Order of the President of the Islamic Transitional State of 
Afghanistan on the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Loya 
Jirga, No 4913, 16/09/1382 (November 2003), http://www.unama-
afg.org/docs/_nonUN%20Docs/_Loya-
Jirga/CLJ/rules%20of%20procedure.doc. 
45 J Alexander Thier, “The Making of a Constitution,” 570-1. 
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the procedures; there was also fear of deadlock prior to 
the adoption of a new constitution.46 
It is remarkable that women were engaged in the 
constitution-making exercise, particularly in the CLJ. 
Their involvement was recognized in the making of 
previous constitutions. The constitutional Loya Jirga in 
the making of the constitution of 1964 contained four 
women and the constitution of 1977 twelve women.47 In 
post-conflict Afghanistan, women were engaged not only 
in the CLJ but also in the Constitutional Commission and 
public consultation. As stated in the draft prepared by the 
Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission:  
“the Commission [would] ensure broad participation 
of women in the constitutional-making process. The 
Constitutional Drafting Commission [consisted] of 
nine members including two women. The 
representation of women [would] increase in the soon 
to be established Commission. The women 
commissioners [would] lead, where possible, 
consultations with women in light of culture 
sensitivities in some areas”.48 
  
Amongst thirty-five members of the CRC, eight of them 
were women. In the CLJ, women constituted 19% of all 
representatives. Despite this development, however, 
criticism remained. In public consultation, it was 
complained that in various regions women were not fairly 
represented. The security concerns were of the main 
 
46 See Institute for War and Peace Reporting, “Afghan Recovery 
Report,” http://iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=p&o=-&apc_state=heniarr2003, 
accessed on 25 September 2007. 
47 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: Women and 
Reconstruction,” ICG Asia Report N 48, Kabul/Brussels, 14 March 
2003, 19, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/48-afghanistan-
women-and-reconstruction.pdf, accessed on 4 February 2020.  
48 The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of 
Afghanistan, “the Constitution-making Process,” 3. 
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reasons barring women from attending the consultation 
process.49  
Finally, the CLJ agreed to adopt the new 
constitution on 4 January 2004.50 Instead of vote, the 
ratification was made by asking the participants to stand 
for one minute to show their agreement to the document. 
It was signed by President Karzai on 26 January 2004.51 
The new constitution was generally accepted by the 
Afghan people and international community, hoping that 
the Constitution would solve the conflict and initiate the 
better future for the country. Speaking at the closing 
ceremony of the CLJ, Lakhdar Brahimi said,  
Is this Constitution perfect? Most probably not. Will 
it be criticized? I fear it will, both inside and outside 
of Afghanistan. But nevertheless, I think that you 
have every reason to feel proud of what you have 
achieved and I am certain that the people of 
Afghanistan are very happy tonight and see in this 
constitution a new source of hope.52  
 
The Constitution lays down the future settlements 
for governance, the national identity, the recognition of 
ethnic and cultural differences, the entrenchment of Islam 
as state religion, the protection of human rights, the 
guarantee of gender equality, etc. It preserves some 
Afghan cultural heritage, while providing reform agenda 
 
49 Ariane Brunet and Isabelle Solon Helal, “Seizing an 
Opportunity: Afghan Women and the Constitution-Making Process,” 
Rights & Democracy Mission Report May-June 2003, 13-4, 
http://www.afghandata.org:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/azu/152
61/azu_acku_pamphlet_hq1735_6_b78_2003_w.pdf?sequence=1&isA
llowed=y, accessed on 4 February 2020. 
50 Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Council Gives Approval to 
Constitution.” The New York Times (nytimes.com), 5 January 2004. 
51 J Alexander Thier, “The Making of a Constitution,” 571. 
52 Impromptu Remarks by the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General, Lakhdar Brahimi, at the Closing Ceremony of the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga (2004), http://www.unama-
afg.org/news/_statement/SRSG/2004/04jan04.htm, accessed on 22 
September 2007. 
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in many sectors in Afghan society. In the next section, 
this paper discusses how some constitutional clauses 
with respect to Islam were made, negotiated and debated. 
It critically analyzes how this process was explicated by 
some observers and the likely consequences of such 
explication. 
 
C. Islam and Shari’a in the Afghan New Constitution 
The making of the Islam-related clauses is an 
excellent example of how recent constitution-making is 
discussed, debated and negotiated amongst diverse actors 
in Afghanistan. This is the arena where foreign actors 
tried, to some extent, to impose their values, the chief 
among them was human rights, and where disagreement 
happened among indigenous actors.53 The process also 
demonstrates how (religious) tradition was negotiated 
with the demands of democracy and modern 
constitutionalism. To look the extent the Islam clauses 
and the Constitution in general could or has achieved, it 
is important to locate the significance of the Islam clauses 
within the constitutional tradition of Afghanistan. Special 
attention is paid to the 1964 Constitution as it laid the 
basis for the creation of the 2004 Constitution.  
 
1. The Place of Islam in the Previous Constitutions  
Two dominant factors are deemed as 
characterizing the constitutions of Afghanistan, namely 
modern reform and preservation of religious and 
traditional values. Modern reform concerns the ideals of 
democracy and liberalism, whereas tradition refers to 
Islamic tradition as embedded in Afghan tribalism. The 
first two Afghan constitutions reflect this contrasted 
culture. The first constitution was promulgated in 1923 
under the King Amanullah. It attempted to build “a 
modern state governed by statutory law of dominantly 
 
53 Barnett R Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution,” 14; Yash Ghai, 
“A Journey around Constitutions,” 827; Noah Feldman, “Imposed 
Constitutionalism,” 868-870. 
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secular nature”.54 After the removal of Amanullah from 
power, the 1931 constitution was crafted under the 
King Mohammad Nadir. In contrast to the previous 
constitution, the 1931 constitution greatly emphasized 
the adherence to Islam and Islamic Shari’a. For 
instance, Article 1 of the 1931 Constitution stated that 
“Islam is the sacred religion of Afghanistan and the 
religious rites performed by the state shall be according 
to the provisions of the Hanafi doctrine”. In Article 19, 
it was enshrined that “no one may be punished except 
by the order of the Shari’a and Islamic Constitution of 
Afghanistan”.55 
The King Mohammad Zahir reigned after the 
assassination of the King Nadir in 1933. Under his 
leadership, the 1931 Constitution remained to govern 
the country until the promulgation of the 1964 
Constitution. This later constitution attempted to 
 
54 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 20. The 
1923 Constitution with respect to the status of Islam was amended 
on 28 January 1925 to accommodate the demands of religious 
leaders. In the original version, Article 2 stated that ‘the religion of 
Afghanistan is the sacred religion of Islam. Followers of other 
religions such as Jews and Hindus residing in Afghanistan are 
entitled to the full protection of the state provided they do not disturb 
the public peace’. After stating that the religion of Afghanistan is the 
sacred religion of Islam, the amendment asserted that ‘and its official 
religious school is the sublime Hanafi school’, and added the 
provision that ‘Hindus and Jews must pay the special tax and wear 
distinctive clothing’. See Fundamental Principles (Constitution) of the 
Kingdom of Afghanistan (Nizamnamah-ye-Asasi-e-Daulat-e-Aliyah-e-
Afghanistan), April 9, 1923 (20 Hamal 1302) Amended January 28, 
1925 (8 Dalw 1303), 
http://www.afghanistantranslation.com/Constitutions/Constitution_
1923-1302_ET.htm#_APPENDIX_B>.   
55 Ussole Assasi (The Main Principles) Government of 
Afghanistan, Published 3 Jadi 1311 (13 December 1932), 
http://www.afghanistantranslation.com/Constitutions/Constitution_
1931-1310_ET_CSTC-A.htm. On the place of Islam in the 1931 
Constitution, see Shamshad Pasarlay, “Rethinking Afghanistan’s 
Longest-Lived Constitution: The 1931 Constitution Through the Lens 
of Constitutional Endurance and Performance Literature,” Elon Law 
Review, Vol. 10 (2018). 
 
 
 
             Ahmad Rofii, Islam, Islamic Law and Constitution Making… | 19 
 
balance the two different determinations in the 
previous constitutions. As Hashim Kamali noted, it 
attempted to “preserve the basic tenets of Islam while 
also responding to the need for social change and 
democratic reform … [and] to reconcile Islamic and 
modern legal and constitutional principles”.56 This 
constitutional approach was followed by the 
subsequent constitutions (the constitutions of 1977 
and 1980).57  
As is the case with the 1931 Constitution, Article 
2 of the 1964 Constitution stipulated that Islam is the 
official religion of Afghanistan and that the state should 
uphold the Hanafi doctrine.58 The constitutional status 
of Islam was guaranteed by the King, who according to 
Article 7 is “the protector of the basic principles of the 
sacred religion of Islam”. The Hanafi legal doctrine 
would be binding for judges whenever there were no 
constitutional and statutory provisions regarding a 
particular case before the court (Article 102). This 
school’s doctrine was also considered as law if in a 
particular area there was no law promulgated by 
parliament (Article 69). The power of the Parliament to 
legislate was limited so as not to repulse “the basic 
principles of the sacred religion of Islam” (article 64). 
The supremacy of Islam in this Constitution was likely 
to be the result of religio-political trends in the previous 
era. Of the causes of the withdrawal of the King 
Amanullah was that he failed to accommodate the 
Muslim traditionalist aspirations in the making of the 
1931 Constitution. The adoption of the 1931 
Constitution, which more Islamic and (Hanafi-based) 
 
56 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 21. See 
also Said Amir Arjomand, “Constitutional Developments in 
Afghanistan: A Comparative and Historical Perspective.” Drake Law 
Review, Vol. 53 (2005), 952. 
57 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 22. 
58 Constitution of Afghanistan, 9 Meezan 1343 (1 October 
1964, 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&c
ontext=afghanenglish, accessed on 3 February 2020. 
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Shari’a oriented, was considered as the answer to them. 
In this regard, the 1964 was arguably the continuation 
of this trend, although providing some changes as 
mentioned before.  
The 1964 Constitution differs from the previous 
constitutions in many provisions.59 It deprived for the 
first time members of the royal family from the 
privileges of holding position of prime minister, of 
seating in parliament and being posted as the Supreme 
Court justices (Article 24). It established the supreme 
power of parliament above the other branches of the 
government. Article 41 stipulated that the Parliament 
“manifests the will of the people and represents the 
whole of the nation”. The Government, according to 
Article 65, was responsible to the House of People 
(Wolesi Jirga). Furthermore, the 1964 Constitution 
particularly departed from the 1931 Constitution in its 
consistent reference to statutory laws (legislative acts) 
instead of the Shari’a. This was likely to be the 
consequence of the principle of the supremacy of the 
Parliament. However, as Hashim Kamali argued, the 
preference of statutes over the Shari’a was merely a 
formal provision in an attempt to unify legal and 
judicial system. In substance, with reference to Article 
64 (“there shall be no law repugnant to the basic 
principles of the sacred religion of Islam”), there was no 
significant difference from the 1931 Constitution in its 
adherence to the Shari’a.60  
 
2. The Making and Status of Islam in the 2004 
Constitution 
In the 2004 Constitution, Islam is granted a 
robust status. In the Preamble, the first statement is 
concerned with the declaration of the conviction to 
 
59 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 42; Said 
Amir Arjomand, “Constitutional Developments in Afghanistan,” 952-
3. 
60 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 42. 
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God and Islam.61 Islam constitutes the very basis of 
the existence of the country. The name given to the 
state is Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Article 2 then 
provides that “the sacred religion of Islam is the 
religion of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”. All 
law must not contradict the tenets and provisions of 
Islam (Article 3). Its national insignia includes the 
phrase “There is no God but Allah and Mohammad is 
His Prophet, and Allah is Great” (Article 19). The right 
to form a political party requires that its manifesto 
and charter must not contravene Islam (Article 35). 
The tenets of Islam are of the basis of the national 
educational curriculum (Article 45). The state is 
obliged to eliminate family-related traditions which 
contradict the principles of Islam (Article 54). The 
president must be an Afghan Muslim (Article 62) is 
sworn to obey and protect Islam (Article 63).  
Noah Feldman said that the Constitution was 
“pervasively Islamic” and “thoroughly democratic”.62 It 
is Islamic because elsewhere in the Constitution, there 
are references to the religion of Islam: Afghanistan is 
called an Islamic Republic, Islam becomes the official 
religion and all law has to be in accordance with this 
religion. Its democratic character is enshrined in the 
Preamble of the Constitution (“to [e]stablish an order 
based on the peoples’ will and democracy”). The 
Afghan Constitution, he argued, is “one possible 
picture of how Islam and democracy can live side-by-
side in the same political vision”.63 
In fact, the making of the Islam-related clauses 
was among the most negotiated constitutional 
clauses. In this respect, Barnett R Rubin gives a 
 
61 The Constitution of Afghanistan, (ratified) 26 January 2004, 
http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/TheConstitutio
n.pdf, accessed on 3 February 2020.  
62 Noah Feldman, “A New Democracy, Enshrined in Faith,” 
The New York Times (nytimes.com), 13 November 2003. He 
commented on the draft constitution. 
63 Ibid. 
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widely cited description of what happened in the 
constitution-making process. He describes the 
activities in the formulation of the Islam clause as 
“balancing outside actors” demands for the 
acceptance of international standards with the 
demands of domestic actors, notably Islamist 
politicians and the ulama.64 Another observer called 
this process as the struggle between secularists and 
fundamentalists, between fundamentalists and 
international experts and activists.65 Within these 
rivalries, Islamist leaders were described as 
demanding the entrenchment of Islam in the new 
constitution. Vice-President Nematullah Shahrani 
particularly urged the inclusion of the words “Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan” in the new constitution. 
International actors, on the other hand, aware of the 
embeddedness of this religion in the Afghan society 
and political discourse, accepted the inclusion of 
Islam but required that nothing in the constitution 
any explicit reference to the Islamic Shari’a.66 Of the 
negotiated compacts, as Rubin noted, Islamist leaders 
agreed with the international demands to accept the 
provision, unqualified by the notion of Shari’a, 
requiring the state to observe the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
international treaties to which the government has 
signed (Article 7). Also, they agreed to the principle of 
equality of men and women in rights and duties before 
the law (Article 22).67  
The abovementioned description wanted to 
explicate the process as negotiations between 
domestic and foreign actors. However, to explain the 
constitutional negotiations in this way seems to fail to 
 
64 Barnett R Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution,” 13-4. 
65 Hannibal Travis, “Freedom or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism 
in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Northwestern University Journal of 
International Human Rights, Vol. 3 (2005), 17. 
66 Barnett R Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution,” 14.  
67 Ibid. 
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acknowledge the complexity of Islam. This is likely to 
be grounded on the assumption of the contrast duality 
between international, western ideals and the Islamic 
tradition: the international actors aim at spreading the 
western constitutionalism, while Islamic tradition 
requires a religious-based system and, to great extent, 
undemocratic provisions. Islam here seems to be 
described in rigidity and absoluteness, ignoring the 
richness and heterogeneity of its perspectives. Islam 
in the recent Afghan experience, as demonstrated 
above, has been identified as “fundamentalism” and 
“theocracy”. Does this explanation reflect the reality of 
the making of the Islam clauses in contemporary 
Afghanistan?  
The debate regarding the character of the state, 
whether Afghanistan should be an Islamic republic or 
merely a republic (Article 1), occurred in the CRC.68 In 
the two out of three occasions, most of the CRC 
members agreed to the second proposal declaring that 
Afghanistan is a republican state. In the third 
occasion, however, the first proposal that stated 
Afghanistan as an Islamic republic adopted by the 
Commission and then uphold by the CLJ. Although it 
was finally concluded that the state was an Islamic 
republic, the fact remained that the members of the 
Commission, as domestic actors, had not been in 
agreement about the relation the Afghan state had to 
religion (Islam). One of the members, Mohammad 
Hashim Kamali, also known as a Muslim scholar in 
Islamic law, was amongst those who supported the 
 
68 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Islam and its Shari’a in the 
Afghan Constitution 2004 with Special Reference to Personal Law,” in 
Nadjma Yassari (ed.), The Shari‘a in the Constitutions of Afghanistan, 
Iran and Egypt – Implications for Private Law (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2005), 24. This Islamic Republic clause had been debated 
together with the title of the constitution, namely whether it read the 
“Constitution of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” or simply the 
“Constitution of Afghanistan”. More on the disagreement on the 
Islamic republic clause, see the dShamshad Pasarlay, “Making the 
2004 Constitution of Afghanistan,” 202-204. 
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republic clause only. His refusal to the Islamic 
Republic clause was based on the fact that this clause 
“had not been expounded anywhere in the text, and as 
such it would appear as somewhat of an isolated 
addition”.69 He warned the implication of adopting the 
Islamic Republic clause that is relating to the issues of 
Islamic punishment, banking interest and women’s 
rights. The lack of definition of what constituted an 
Islamic republic would have a serious unresolved 
problem to the system, as demonstrated by those 
issues.  
Kamali and other members of the CRC’s 
standpoint on the topic show that the concept of an 
Islamic state (Afghanistan as an Islamic republic) is 
clouded by uncertainties and inconclusiveness. 
Instead of internationally imposed, this was part of 
the members’ consideration; a consideration that was 
based on religious deliberation, stemming from a self-
critical reflection. Kamali criticized the puritan 
Islamist agenda and argued that it was more of an 
idea than an obvious system. As he takes a 
substantive approach to this issue, he suggests that 
“an Islamic state is thus any system of rule that 
upholds the injunctions of Islam on equality and 
justice, on consultation, and the basic rights and 
liberties of the people”.70 His substantive approach is 
shared by many Muslim scholars around Muslim 
countries.71 
 
69 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Islam and its Shari’a,” 25. 
70 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ‘The Islamic State: Origins, 
Definition and Salient Attributes,” in K S Nathan and Mohammad 
Hashim Kamali (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and 
Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof 
Ishak Institute, 2006), 295. 
71 Such as Mohammad Asad, Fazlur Rahman, Nurcholish 
Madjid, Abdol Karim Soroush, Khaled Abou El Fadl, Abdullahi Ahmed 
An-Na’im. See, eg, Charles Kurzman (ed.), Liberal Islam: A Source 
Book (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Khaled Abou El Fadl, et 
al, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy: A Boston Review Book 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004). On the 
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The disagreement among domestic actors also 
occurred with regard to Article 2. The earlier draft of 
this article agreed by the CDC stipulated that “the 
religion of Afghanistan is the sacred religion of Islam. 
Followers of other religions are free to exercise their 
creeds within the provisions of the law”.72 The 
sweeping reference to ‘Afghanistan’ was considered 
problematic since it would ignore other religions 
followed by the Afghan people. A proposal for changing 
the draft so that it would limit the designation of 
religion only to the state was rejected at the CRC. The 
idea was then accepted during the CLJ convention.73 
The final version of Article 2 establishes Islam as the 
religion of the state of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan. 
 
3. The New Role of Islamic Law 
The 2004 Constitution enshrines a new but 
significant role of Islamic law in the country. It 
departs quite substantially from that of the 1964 
Constitution. On the one hand, the 2004 Constitution 
becomes more inclusive in that it provides relatively 
equal treatment to all legal schools (mazhab), both the 
Hanafi and the Shi’a. The 1964 Constitution provided 
that the state’s school of law was in accordance with 
the Hanafi doctrine (Article 2). In the drafting process 
of the 2004 Constitution, a recommendation was 
proposed to omit the preference to the Hanafi school. 
Instead, the reference was made to “the sacred religion 
of Islam” so as to encompass both Hanafi and Shi’ite 
 
substantive approach to Islam, see Nadirsyah Hosen, Shari’a & 
Constitutional Reform in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007). 
72 The (Draft) Constitution of Afghanistan Year 1382, 
http://www.constitution.org/cons/afghan/draft_cons_eng.htm, 
accessed on 3 February 2020. 
73 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “References to Islam and 
Women in the Afghan Constitution,” Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 22 
(2008), 285; Barnett R Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution,” 14. 
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schools.74 Politically speaking, the removal of the 
Hanafi phrase might be explained, as Rubin said, 
according to the fact that Shi’ite community in post-
war Afghanistan had more significant bargaining. This 
factor together with the influence of Iran necessitated 
that the religion clause should be stated in general 
without reference to particular schools or rites.75 The 
robust status of the Shi’ite school is further 
emphasized in Article 131 providing a guarantee on 
the application of the Shi’a jurisprudence for its 
followers in cases related to personal matters. 
However, the Hanafi doctrines still have residual 
legitimacy in that courts will apply this school’s 
jurisprudence in cases to which no constitutional or 
statutory provision is available (Article 130). Kamali 
correctly said that Hanafi doctrine would now be 
“applied law only if the existing statutes for not cover 
a case under judicial consideration”. It does no longer 
supplement statutory law generally as was the case in 
the 1964 Constitution.76 
On the other hand, the 2004 Constitution grants 
Islamic law more decisive role and even supreme 
authority within the Afghan legal system. This is 
evident from the repugnancy clause. Article 64 of the 
1964 provided that basis of the validity of all laws is 
that they should conform to the basic principles and 
other values embodied in this Constitution. The draft 
constitution of 2003, attempting to reinstate this 
formulation, changed the provisions into “the sacred 
religion of Islam and the values of this Constitution”. 
The debate over this provision in the CLJ was mostly 
concluded with a significant amendment, when 105 
delegates supported a proposal to change the draft 
 
74 See Saïd Amir Arjomand, ‘The Role of Religion and the 
Hanafi and Ja’fari Jurisprudence in the New Constitution of 
Afghanistan,” in Afghanistan: Towards a New Constitution (Center on 
International Cooperation, New York University, 2003), 18. 
75 Barnett R Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution,” 14. 
76 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Islam and its Shari’a,” 36. 
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and the Reconciliation Committee adopted.77 The 
proposal which was adopted in the new constitution 
provided that the principle underlying the non-
contravention clause is ‘the tenets and provisions’ 
(mu‘taqadāt wa aḥkām) of Islam, while the words 
‘values of this constitution’ were omitted. The words 
‘the tenets and provisions’ embodied the very 
substance of Islam, namely Islamic creeds (‘aqīdah) 
and laws (sharī‘a).78 In this sense, Islamic doctrines 
whether beliefs or laws are the supreme reference 
which determines the legality of any law passed by the 
parliament. For many observers, this is highly 
considered as the entrenchment of Shari’a law.79 This 
also demonstrated that international actors’ demand 
of the removal of any reference to Shari’a in the 
constitution has accordingly been defeated.80 
The repugnancy clause raises a question of which 
state institution has the final word in deciding that a 
particular law is in accordance with or contrary to the 
tenets and provisions of Islam. Article 121 of the 2004 
Constitution provides that “at the request of the 
Government, or courts, the Supreme Court shall 
review the laws, legislative decrees, international 
treaties as well as international covenants for their 
compliance with the Constitution and their 
interpretation in accordance with the law”. This 
provision grants the Supreme Court for the first time 
the power of constitutional review. Previously, in the 
 
77 Michael Schoiswohl, “Linking the International Legal 
Framework to Building the Formal Foundations of a “State at Risk”: 
Constitution-Making and International Law in Post-Conflict 
Afghanistan,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 39 (2006), 
836-7. See also Said Amir Arjomand, “Constitutional Developments in 
Afghanistan.” 958-9. 
78 See Maḥmūd Shaltūt, al-Islām ‘Aqīdah wa Sharī’ah (Kuwait: 
Dār al-Qalam, 1980).  
79 See also Barnett R Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution,” 15; J 
Alexander Thier, “The Making of a Constitution,” 578.  
80 Michael Schoiswohl, “Linking the International Legal 
Framework,” 837, 854; Hannibal Travis, above n 66, 19. 
 
 
 
 
28 | Mazahib Jurnal Pemikiran Hukum Islam, Vol 19 No. 1 (June 2020) 
drafting process experts debated the possibility of 
establishing constitutional review. It was also debated 
whether such review would be granted to a specialized 
court (constitutional court) or to a chamber in the 
Supreme Court. One optional opinion recommended 
the establishment of a constitutional court, arguing, 
among others, that such court would solve the 
existing problem of the unaccountable judiciary and 
state bureaucracy whose personnel were mostly 
unqualified for the new system.81 The Commission 
approved to the proposal and had brought it to the 
CLJ. However, the proposal was rejected for the fear 
that such court would be similar to the Council of 
Guardian of Iran.82 The final draft of the new 
constitution was concluded with vesting the power of 
constitutional review to the Supreme Court (Article 
121). This along with few changes was then adopted in 
the 2004 Constitution. While the text itself might be 
understood otherwise, Article 121 was originally 
intended to grant the Supreme Court with such 
authority as to interpret the Constitution.83 
Although the idea of establishing a specialized 
constitutional court had not been adopted, the CLJ 
agreed to establish the Independent Commission for 
Overseeing of the Implementation of the Constitution 
(Article 157).84 This article was drafted for the transitional 
purpose as its provision is placed in the Transitional 
Provisions chapter. Its authority, however, is not clearly 
defined. It has been contentious whether the Commission 
has the authority in interpreting the Constitution. This in 
 
81 Saïd Amir Arjomand and Kim Lane Scheppele, 
Constitutional Court for Afghanistan, in Afghanistan: Towards a New 
Constitution, 125.  
82 Barnett R Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution,” 15; Michael 
Schoiswohl, “Linking the International Legal Framework,” 838. 
83 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Afghanistan’s Constitution Ten 
Years On: What are the Issues? (Kabul: AREU, 2014), 12-3, note 45. 
84 See J Alexander Thier, “The Making of a Constitution,” 578.  
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practice would give rise to a conflict of jurisdiction 
between the Commission and the Supreme Court.85  
For some scholars, the provision on constitutional 
review in conjunction with the repugnancy clause (Article 
3) would mean that the Supreme Court would have the 
supreme power to determine whether a particular law or 
international treaty is in conflict with Islamic beliefs and 
provisions. These provisions, they argued, could give the 
Court ammunitions to undermine international human 
rights norms86 and as the ‘back door’ for the 
fundamentalists to enforce their interpretation.87  
Despite the fact that no cases of judicial review have 
been decided,88 constitutionally speaking it is clear that 
the Supreme Court has the ultimate power to strike down 
any legislative acts, international treaties and covenants 
which according to the Court’s interpretation contradict 
the Constitution. The fear that this provision would 
provide the Court with the review against Islamic law and 
thus would undermine international standards might be 
justified on the ground of specific interpretation of Article 
3, which refers the tenets and provisions of Islam to a 
puritan and fundamentalist view. This is also supported 
by the Court’s decisions under the Chief Justice Fazel 
Hadi Shinwari.89 However, the Constitution itself does not 
give a direct reference to Islamic law as the sole basis of 
constitutional review. It reads that the basis of all review 
is the compliance with the Constitution and their 
interpretation in accordance with the law. In deciding the 
constitutionality of law, the Supreme Court would be 
 
85 See Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Afghanistan’s Constitution, 
13-4; Ghizaal Haress, Judicial Review in Afghanistan: A Flawed 
Practice (Kabul: AREU, 2017), 14-5.  
86 Michael Schoiswohl, “Linking the International Legal 
Framework,” 837-8;  
87 Hannibal Travis, “Freedom or Theocracy?,” 19.  
88 See Ghizaal Haress, Judicial Review in Afghanistan. 
89 Hannibal Travis, “Freedom or Theocracy?,” 20-5. Amongst 
those decisions include outlawing secular political parties, curtailing 
political debate, persecuting religious minorities, enforcing cruel 
punishment and discriminating against women. 
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bound by the Constitution as the Court interprets it. One 
line of interpretation might be similar to the one assumed 
above, the fundamentalist interpretation. The other line, 
on the other hand, might suggest that the Court should 
consider the tenets and provisions of Islam along with 
other constitutional provisions such as on equality 
between men and women and adherence to international 
human rights norms. Thus, it depends on the approach 
taken in constitutional interpretation by the Court. In this 
respect Noah Feldman correctly noted that “one 
dominated by illiberal religious scholars might interpret 
the text one way, while one with a majority of judges 
trained in the secular tradition might see it very 
differently”.90  
In addition, the conclusion that the reference to 
Islamic law in the constitutional review would undermine 
international human rights norms and principles of 
democracy comes from the underlying assumption that 
Islamic law is incompatible with human rights and the 
ideals of democracy. A bulk of literature on the relations 
of Islamic law and human rights and democracy will show 
that there are various approaches in the Islamic 
scholarship to the issue.91 These different approaches 
span from a puritan extremist to a very liberal approach. 
To speak of Islam as a single and absolute standpoint 
accordingly becomes impossible. Islam and its law 
(Shari’a) have in fact been interpreted in a way that, for 
some observers, is compatible with human rights norms 
 
90 Noah Feldman, “A New Democracy”. 
91 On the normative relationships between Islam on the one 
hand, and human rights and democracy on the other, see, eg, 
Mashood A Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Abdullah Saeed. Human 
Rights and Islam: An Introduction to Key Debates between Islamic Law 
and International Human Rights Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 
2018); M A Muqtedar Khan (ed.), Islamic Democratic Discourse: 
Theory, Debates and Philosophical Perspectives (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2006); Nader Hashemi, “Islam and Democracy.” in John L. 
Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Islam and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 68. 
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and democracy. For some Muslim scholars, this is truly 
the position of Islam from the very beginning of its 
history. Apart from the so-called Islamist perspective, this 
view supports the moderate position. As Abou El Fadl 
argued “many moderate Muslims believe that while it 
would be disingenuous to pretend that Islamic law offers 
its own ready-made list of human rights, human rights as 
a concept and democracy as a system of governance are 
entirely reconcilable with Islamic theology and law”.92 
With this in mind, it is plausible and justifiable that 
the interpretation of the tenets and provisions of Islam 
would go hand in hand with the constitutional provisions 
that uphold human rights and democratic values. It is 
‘Islamic’ that the constitutional review would consider 
equally Article 3 of the Constitution together with Article 7 
(human rights) and 22 (gender equality). Thus, the 
difference of interpretation is not only between ‘illiberal 
religious scholars’ and secularly educated judges as 
Feldman said, but also between puritan and moderate 
Muslim scholars or judges.  
 
D. Conclusion 
The above discussion demonstrates that the 
constitution-making in Afghanistan particularly with 
regard to the Islam clauses is the acts of negotiations 
between different competing actors. It is not only between 
international and domestic actors, but also among 
domestic actors. As evident in the making of the Islam 
clauses, these negotiations might be characterized as 
between puritan Islamist and more moderate Muslim 
actors. The descriptions provided by some observers 
about the role of international and domestic actors in 
constitution-making reveal their underlying assumption 
that makes these descriptions flawed. 
The new constitution of Afghanistan was crafted as 
an instrument of conflict resolutions resulted from 
dialogue and negotiations. The Constitution was aimed at 
 
92 Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from 
the Extremists (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005), 183. 
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transforming and even resolving the current conflicts 
amongst Afghan interest groups. Its goal was also to 
provide constitutional settlements that would create a 
better future for Afghan people. How successful the 
Constitution fulfils these objectives is a matter beyond the 
scope of this essay.  
The international and foreign engagement in the 
process of constitution-making was obvious in the making 
of the post-world war constitutions. The essay shows the 
role of international experts in preparing the draft and 
negotiating the contents of the draft. The role of these 
foreign actors in the formulation of constitutional 
provisions, however, could not be exaggerated.93 For some 
observers, as discussed above, the creation of the Islam 
clauses was the result of the negotiations between 
international actors, who proposed the provisions 
commonly entrenched in the western liberal constitutions, 
and domestic Islamist actors, who urged the 
establishment of Islamic norms in the constitution. This 
explanation, however, failed to acknowledge the debate 
amongst domestic actors. There were in fact negotiations 
between moderate Afghan Muslims and puritan Islamists. 
This leads this essay to uncover the assumption 
underlying this explanation. It is likely that the observers 
perceived Islam as religion of totality, closeness, 
homogeneity and stability. Islam was understood as 
unified doctrine which negated the plurality of 
perspectives. In this sense, it failed to provide the fair 
description of constitution-making in Afghanistan. Islam 
is perceived differently as in Afghanistan as anywhere in 
the Muslim world. There are radical Islamists who are 
against democracy and gender equality, but there are 
moderate Muslims who see the compatibility of Islam and 
human rights and the ideals of constitutionalism.  
 
93 Shamshad Pasarlay demonstrates that there was no 
significant influence, if any, from the international community in the 
constitution-making process in Afghanistan. Their part might be best 
described as ‘mere suggestions’. Shamshad Pasarlay, “Making the 
2004 Constitution of Afghanistan”, 218-221. 
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